Strategic Afro-Modernism, Dynamic Hybridity, and Bebop's Socio-Political Significance by Nielsen, Cynthia R.
(C
) E
me
ral
d G
rou
p P
ub
lis
hin
g
STRATEGIC AFRO-MODERNISM,
DYNAMIC HYBRIDITY, AND
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ABSTRACT
Purpose  I argue that one can articulate a historically attuned and
analytically rich model for understanding jazz in its various inflections.
That is, on the one hand, such a model permits us to affirm jazz as a
historically conditioned, dynamic hybridity. On the other hand, to
acknowledge jazz’s open and multiple character in no way negates our
ability to identify discernible features of various styles and esthetic
traditions. Additionally, my model affirms the sociopolitical, legal (Jim
Crow and copyright laws), and economic structures that shaped
jazz. Consequently, my articulation of bebop as an inflection of Afro-
modernism highlights the sociopolitical, and highly racialized context in
which this music was created. Without a recognition of the sociopolitical
import of bebop, one’s understanding of the music is impoverished, as
one fails to grasp the strategic uses to which the music and discourses
about the music were put.
Music and Law
Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, Volume 18, 129148
Copyrightr 2013 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 1521-6136/doi:10.1108/S1521-6136(2013)0000018009
129
(C
) E
me
ral
d G
rou
p P
ub
lis
hin
g
Design methodology/approach  I engage in an interdisciplinary study
of jazz via analyses and commentary on selected texts from several scho-
larly disciplines.
Findings  To acknowledge the hybridity and social construction of jazz
esthetics in no way nullifies the innovations and leadership of African
American jazz musicians whose artistic contributions not only signifi-
cantly shaped modern jazz in the mid-twentieth century but also whose
musical voices continue to sound and set esthetical standards in contem-
porary expressions of jazz (and beyond).
Originality and value  My chapter is highly interdisciplinary, bringing
philosophical explanations of race, discourse, and the ontology of music
into conversation with numerous sociological and (ethno)musicological
insights about jazz.
Keywords: Afro-modernism; hybridity; jazz esthetics; bebop; race;
jazz discourses
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I argue that if race is socially constructed (and I believe it
is), then jazz esthetics must also be understood and more carefully articu-
lated as socially constructed. Both race and jazz esthetics are conditioned
by cultural, political, legal, economic, and myriad other social narratives,
discourses, and practices. As social realities, neither race nor African
American or European musical styles emerge from an immutable essence
or consist in a fixed set of characteristics purporting to define (once and for
all) what it is to be black or authentically “black” bebop or “white” cool
jazz. An analysis of the complex social ontology of jazz esthetics reveals
both the hybridity of jazz and provides a model for understanding dynamic
identity. Although a historical and thoroughly social reality, jazz (and by
extension this applies to European classical and other musical genres,
styles, and inflections) communicates something about the social context,
history, and the pre-history in which it is created and performed. For exam-
ple, the bebop of the 1940s1960s is of course intimately connected to the
histories and struggles of African Americans, both of which were played
out and developed in relation to whites of various political, religious,
national, international, social, and esthetic sensibilities.1 In short, my claim
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is that music (and bebop in particular), like other social realities, is an ever-
morphing mulatto.
To claim that categories such as race, blackness, whiteness, black
esthetics, and the like are socially constructed is in no way to deny the stark
differences in lived experience of various ethnic groups  in particular,
the numerous injustices experienced by blacks due to racist practices and
residing in a racially structured society that exploited blacks and benefited
whites. Nor is it to deny that specific musical characteristics at particular
historical moments are often associated with Afro (black) or Euro (white)
musical styles and esthetics. Lastly, to argue for the social construction of
esthetical categories by no means negates the decisive, formative contribu-
tions, innovations, and leadership of musicians such as Dizzy Gillespie,
Charlie Parker, Miles Davis, and countless other African American artists
whose “musical signatures” both significantly shaped modern jazz in the
mid-twentieth century and whose voices continue to sound and re-sound in
current expressions of jazz.
Although Afro-modern esthetics and European classical esthetics are
not fixed essences but like “race” are dynamic, historical, social realities,
they nonetheless exhibit a provisional fixity or fluid identity. This dynamic
identity or ontology is shaped and maintained by historically specific
sociopolitical structures, as well as particular discourses and practices.
Moreover, the affirmation of the historical and constructed character of
various musical esthetics in no way negates our ability to identify their (his-
torically shaped and always permeable) characteristics and features. Stated
otherwise, musical esthetics are socially conditioned and highly fluid reali-
ties; yet such fluidity coexists with a “staying power” or nonpermanent
fixity allowing one to identify (via musical theoretical analysis and aural
skills of various degrees) a clearly recognized esthetic, style, or genre. Thus,
particular esthetics and styles such as blues, Afro-modernism, French
Impressionism (as a style within European classical music), tonal serialism,
etc., can congeal into something quite recognizable and transferable and
yet remain open to alterations and (re)harmonizations creating new (future)
styles.
Here it is instructive to draw upon Michel Foucault’s notion of historical
a prioris. According to Foucault, as the qualifier emphasizes, historical a
prioris are historically conditioned structures or rules that make possible the
emergence of various kinds of knowledge and discourse. In addition, they
define by way of fulfillment requirements what counts in a particular histor-
ical epoch as valid or legitimate expressions of knowing, being, or doing.
However, unlike Kantian a priori conditioning structures, Foucauldian
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historical a prioris are themselves subject to change over time. In other
words, Foucault’s structures are mutable and historically particular  or as
he might put it, episteme-specific. Yet given their function as conditioning
structures that make it possible for certain kinds of discourse, knowledge,
and practice to appear, they change less frequently and can last for decades
and even centuries, thus allowing various styles, traditions, and recognizable
esthetical expressions to come into focus, gain momentum and esteem, and,
as it were, take on lives of their own.
By employing Foucault’s insights regarding historical conditioning
structures and the analyses of ethnomusicologists and other scholars of
African American music cognizant of race and musical esthetics as socially
constructed realities, I argue that one can articulate a historically attuned
and analytically rich model for understanding jazz in its various inflections.
That is, on the one hand, such a model permits us to affirm jazz as a
historically conditioned, ever-open dynamic hybridity. On the other hand,
to acknowledge the hybridity and fluidity of jazz in no way negates our
ability to identify discernible features commonly recognized as constituting,
for example, Afro-modernist jazz inflections such as bebop, as well as mul-
tiple other musical styles and esthetics.2 Of course, music-making as crea-
tive human activity takes place in specific historical contexts. Hence, not
only multiple musical streams but also sociopolitical, cultural, legal, and
economic structures and practices influence and condition all types of
music-making.
Given America’s long history of racism  and in no way denying that
definitive emancipatory gains had been won  unjust racist structures
and practices remained entrenched throughout the twentieth century (and
many, no doubt, continue today). Such racialized structures, which privi-
leged whites, created significant barriers for African Americans in their
pursuit of equal recognition and opportunities to live a life of human
flourishing. Although black jazz musicians were often recognized by the
dominant society for their extraordinary talents, such recognition existed
simultaneously with “Whites Only” signs. In other words, even when black
musical talent was publicly affirmed and lauded, discrimination in the
world of music was just as prevalent as discrimination in other social and
economic spheres, making it difficult for African American musicians to
earn a living wage. Moreover, white ownership of clubs, hotels, concert
halls, and record companies created a power differential, which when
operative within a racialized society, meant that white musicians often
received the best performing venues with respect to both monetary and
cultural capital. In contrast, blacks were given less prestigious performance
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sites and regularly received inadequate and incommensurate pay for their
artistic creations and musical performances (see, e.g., Monson, 2007,
Chapter 2). To bracket this history in the study of jazz is to fail to hear
what the music says and to fail to recognize the power of music  even
instrumental music  both to (re)narrate collective (and personal) identity
and to sound a polyphonic, multi-layered sociopolitical critique. As
Guthrie P. Ramsey puts it, “the political import of bebop could not be
(and was not) ignored. […] these were signifying texts, indeed” (Ramsey,
2003, p. 108; see also, Thomas, 1995; Kelly, 1997).
I begin by explaining how particular American legal discourses and
social practices constructed “blackness” and helped to establish artificial
and harmful blackwhite binaries. I then focus on jazz’s mixed heritage. In
this section, I especially emphasize the sociopolitical dimensions of jazz.
The notion of music as a site of struggle is a natural segue into an explora-
tion of bebop as an instance of Afro-modernism. Having highlighted the
hybridity of bebop and its sociopolitical import, I then examine how tradi-
tional Western discourses privileging the composer over the jazz improviser
worked in conjunction with early copyright laws to disadvantage the latter
economically and socio-culturally. Following the discussion of bebop as a
strategic inflection of Afro-modernism, I turn to an analysis of Foucault’s
work on historical a prioris and the acceptability conditions of discourse,
as well as Monson’s analyses of jazz discourses and her notion of sonic
signifyin(g).
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF RACE: THE
ONE-DROP RULE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
(FALSE) BINARIES
As students and scholars of race and African American history observe, the
one-drop rule plays an especially important and rather idiosyncratic role in
the legal construction of blackness in the history of the United States.
Although the one-drop rule was an “unofficial” social practice during the
years of chattel slavery, it was employed regularly as a way to maintain a
strict blackwhite divide. Children who were the offspring of white and
black sexual unions  many of which were born as a result of white mas-
ters raping their black female slaves  presented a problem for the domi-
nant society. The hybridity of the mulatto child posed, on the one hand, an
ontological challenge to the artificiality of the white-constructed color line
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and a potential threat to the social, political, and economic advantages
created by this one-sided system. To deal with this categorization “pro-
blem,” Southern states created and applied the one-drop rule: anyone pos-
sessing “one drop” of so-called black blood or any trace of African
ancestry was considered black. Consequently, biracial children of slave
women were deemed slaves at birth and thus became the property of their
white masters  masters who were also their fathers.
However, the one-drop rule did not disappear after slavery was abol-
ished. In fact, during the Jim Crow era, the one-drop rule became codified
as law (see, e.g., Khanna, 2010, esp. 98101). As expressed in its nine-
teenth-century manifestation and working hand-in-hand with Jim Crow
legislation, the one-drop rule proclaimed that any person with “traceable
black ancestry” was considered legally black. Tellingly, the percentage or
trace of black ancestry legally constituting an individual as black varied
over time and from state to state. For example, until 1910 in Virginia, a
person was classified under law as “colored” if he or she had one-quarter
or more African ancestry; however, from 1910 to 1924 Virginia decided to
“lower” the requirement for blackness to include those with one-sixteenth
black ancestry (Monson, 2007, p. 8). Following this period (post-1924),
Virginia declared that in order for a person to be judged legally white, he
or she must possess no trace of African ancestry  not even “one-drop” of
“black” blood (Monson, 2007, p. 8).
Many who were one-eighth black or less exhibited none of the outward
markers associated with African or African American descent. In other
words, they could “pass” as white since they were extremely light-skinned;
and skin color, given its visibility, tended to be the outward “sign” most
heavily scrutinized. Since the requirements of the one-drop rule varied
from state to state, those who were legally classified as black in one state
might be judged white in another. Thus, the act of crossing a state border
could (at least given the “logic” of the theory) change one’s racial classifica-
tion and significantly impact one’s life-course. In addition, those who in a
former period were not considered “colored” because they were only one-
sixteenth black  were they still alive  would be legally deemed black in a
later period when the African ancestral percentage-requirements became
stricter. These examples highlight the mutability of race as well as the ways
in which legal constructs and social practices and discourses combine in
order to shape and produce race for political, economic, and other pur-
poses. Moreover, what was in fact a wide color spectrum and a diverse
mixed heritage, including not only black and white mixed ancestries but
also black and Native American as well as black and Native American and
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European and Native-American combinations, was forced into an unna-
tural blackwhite binary. What existed in reality as a mixed heritage or
hybridity was presented as a rigid, fixed, impenetrable dichotomy. As
Monson explains, the purpose of the one-drop rule was to preserve and
uphold “white purity and domination by assigning intermixture to the leg-
ally subordinate category. […] The strict binary racial classification of Jim
Crow attempted to legislate a clear division in a society that was far more
hybrid than segregation laws admitted” (Monson, 2007, pp. 89).3
Along similar lines, discourses about jazz have arisen that mirror these
artificial, binary whiteblack classifications and thus imply and perpetuate
the false notion that a fixed racial essence informs musical esthetics and
styles. Utilizing the insights from multiple scholars and disciplines, I reject
this overly rigid, ahistorical characterization of musical esthetics. In its
place, I present a historically sensitive understanding of jazz  focusing
mainly on bebop  that, on the one hand, takes seriously the contributions
and innovations of canonical African American musicians such as Dizzy
Gillespie and Charlie Parker, yet on the other hand, recognizes the hybrid-
ity of music-making and the dynamic ontology of music itself. In addition,
my model embraces the notion of music as a site of struggle and a means
for collective and personal (re)narrations and sociopolitical censure. In the
following section, I discuss (1) the ontology of jazz  its hybridity and
dynamic identity  and (2) the sociopolitical dimensions of jazz both musi-
cally (i.e., the music itself) and discursively (i.e., the discourses about jazz).
JAZZ’S MIXED HERITAGE: POWER
DIFFERENTIALS AND STRATEGIC
DISCURSIVE AND SONIC SIGNIFYIN(G)
In a recent short essay, Ronald Radano highlights the power of slave music
to exceed the controlling, exploitative grasp of white slave owners (2010,
p. 366). How is this possible? How can that which is produced by the
master’s “property” somehow free itself from the master’s chains? Slaves, of
course, were not “things,” and their ability to create beautiful, profoundly
moving music underscores the absurdity, greed, and self-deception upon
which chattel slavery was built. Humans, not inanimate objects, create
music.4 In other words, the ability to compose music not only for esthetic
but also for strategic sociopolitical purposes  whether bebop, Baroque,
avant-garde, or hip hop  is a distinctly human capacity. As complex social,
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intellectual, affective, and creative acts, music-making and the enjoyments
of music are human activities that, among other things, allow our stories to
be told and our sufferings and joys to be heard and shared. Moreover, like
great works of literature and philosophy, music carries within itself a multi-
plicity of voices  past and present  creatively harmonized and crafted
into an identifiable form and content, yet always open to future (re)harmo-
nizations and (re)interpretations. As a social and cultural artifact, music
often arises from sites of struggle. For example, black spirituals and much
of the blues and jazz styles created and performed by African Americans
was birthed amid intense social and political struggle. Given this racialized
and exploitative social context, music-making was not a mere autonomous,
art-for-art’s-sake activity. As Ramsey explains, “the cultural politics of
African American music has developed within powerful ideologies sur-
rounding race. For that reason, the principle of artistic autonomy could not
develop within black culture in the same way as it had with regard to the
Western art music tradition” (Ramsey, 2003, p. 109). This is neither to dis-
own the modernist impulses and influences on jazz and bebop in particular
nor to deny bebop’s status as art music; rather, it is to claim that in addition
to its esthetic value as a human artistic work, music-making and perfor-
mance functioned as powerful sociopolitical (nonviolent) “weapons,” chal-
lenging dominant narratives and providing a way for African Americans to
re-narrate a white-scripted history while leaving their esthetic mark on
American culture (and beyond).
Just as slaves intentionally engaged in distinctly human creative acts and
often for strategic, counter-hegemonic purposes, African American jazz
musicians of the 1940s1960s likewise gifted American culture with land-
mark musical contributions, many of which carried intentional social and
political messages. Even a musician such as Thelonious Monk, who is often
labeled as an apolitical jazzman, was well aware of the daily racial injus-
tices blacks experienced. Monk, for example, devoted his time, talent, and
money to the African American struggle for civil rights and economic
equality through benefit concerts and other venues. In other words, there
were many different ways in which a jazz musician might express his or her
allegiance to and participation in the civil rights movement. Some musi-
cians such as Max Roach and Abby Lincoln were outspoken figures who
composed specific musical compositions with conspicuous political protests
(see, e.g., Monson, 2007, Chapter 5).5 Others believed that by dedicating
themselves to the creation of outstanding, ground-breaking music, the
excellence of their artistic contributions would help to expose the absurdity
and falsity of long-held negative assessments of African Americans’
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intellectual, moral, and esthetic capabilities. Yet even with this latter
approach where the focus is on the music itself, one of the intended and
anticipated outcomes is to participate in the communal struggle of disman-
tling unjust structures and re-writing racialized narratives in order to estab-
lish a more just and equal social, economic, and political standing for
African Americans.
America’s history of unjust and exploitative treatment of African
Americans  from the Jim Crow South color-coded laws to the Northern
ghettos, urban riots, and the various protests and activities that led to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964  significantly impacted the lives of
African American jazz musicians and their artistic creations. For example,
commenting on the jazz modernism of the 1940s, Eric Lott observes, “it is
impossible to absorb the [be]bop attack without its social reference” (1988,
p. 597). Of course, individual musicians channeled their frustration, anger,
disappointment, and countless other emotions differently. Some chose the
route of open protest via association with black nationalist or other politi-
cal groups dedicated to dismantling racial, sociopolitical, and economic
inequality. As mentioned earlier, others chose different strategies and
expressed their frustrations and protests primarily through their music. For
example, scholars have commented on how African American jazz musi-
cians, given their unequal economic and social treatment in the music
world, intentionally created complex musical harmonies performed at
blinding tempos that allowed them to display their virtuosity while
leaving their white counterparts at times baffled and unable to compete
(see, e.g., Lott, 1988). This situation, of course, was not the case for all
white jazz artists, as some were quite capable of navigating bebop’s
extended harmonies and lightning tempos. However, the interracial
tensions and societal structural inequalities that African Americans jazz
artists experienced undoubtedly impacted their creative compositional
responses to the music’s evolution and oft-associated key characteristics.
Commenting on bebop in general as well as Charlie Parker’s contributions
and artistic participation in the broader African American struggle for
equality, Lott states: “Bebop was about making disciplined imagination
alive and answerable to the social changes of its time. […] jazz was a strug-
gle which pitted mind against the perversity of circumstance, and that in
this struggle, blinding virtuosity was the best weapon” (1988, p. 597). In
short, one might say that the racialized social, political, and economic con-
texts served as at least partial conditions making possible some of the
important harmonic and other musical innovations and characteristic fea-
tures of bebop.
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Along similar lines, consider the by-and-large positive experiences of
African American jazz musicians such as Dizzy Gillespie and Charlie Parker
as they toured and spent time in Europe (see, e.g., Monson, 2007, p. 86).
Quite unlike their thoroughly racialized and exploitative socio-economic
context in the United States, Europe presented them with a context in which
they were not only admired for their artistic abilities  which was the case
in America among certain jazz connoisseurs and aficionados  but also,
and more importantly, where they were treated as fellow human beings:
moral and intellectual equals worthy of respect and dignity. This favorable
treatment African American musicians experienced while performing in
Europe serves as an important backdrop for understanding the complex
relation that black jazz musicians have had with the modernist or “high art”
tradition.
Bebop as a Hybrid Inflection of Strategic Afro-Modernism
Although it shares several features and impetuses with so-called classical
modernism  for example, formal innovations and reaching new heights of
expressivity  Afro-modernism of the mid-twentieth century (roughly
19401960) manifests distinctive characteristics arising from and related to
the particular sociopolitical and economic struggles of African Americans.
Guthrie P. Ramsey highlights one aspect of Afro-modernism as the process
of African Americans grappling with their place in the modern industria-
lized, capitalistic world and working out their thoughts, feelings, and
stances artistically and collectively (2003, p. 97). Whether we find Afro-
modernist overtones expressed via bebop’s structural expansions, exceed-
ingly complex harmonies, extended and virtuosic improvised solos, or
hybrid African, African American, and Afro-Cuban musical styles, one
must also take into account the tension-ridden, racially conflicted socio-
political and economic context from which the music emerged.6 To
illustrate, consider my earlier statement that it is a mistake or at least an
incomplete characterization to describe bebop as chiefly concerned with the
principle of artistic autonomy. Granting this claim and considering the
racialized context in which it operated, bebop artists and advocates strate-
gically employed a modernist narrative of autonomy in order to challenge
and subvert stereotypical depictions of black musicians as mere entertainers
(for whites). In the process of deconstructing white-imposed narratives of
what a black musician is or ought to be, bebop artists self-consciously
appropriated modernist tropes and discourses to construct their own
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personal and collective Afro-modernist stories. Yet as Ramsey explains,
not only do the new black-scripted modernist narratives proclaim that
bebop was neither “dance music” nor “conceived for mass consumption,”
it also asserted that bebop was “not designed for traditional ‘high brow’
concert audiences” (Ramsey, 2003, p. 106).
Although it drew upon past sources  from both the Afro and Euro
traditions  and was thus clearly hybrid in nature, bebop as an Afro-
modernist art form was something new. Having broken down the tradi-
tional rigid barriers and antagonisms between so-called “high” art music
and “folk” music, as well as discourses claiming that art music has no
political import, bebop opened up a new musical horizon whose artistic
excellence carried sociopolitical substance. As Henry Louis Gates Jr. might
put it, bebop musicians’ (re)harmonizations and transformations of musical
“texts,” traditions, and discourses were signifin(g) acts. That is, not only
the discourses about bebop but also the musical pieces themselves are
instances of “black double-voicedness” and repetition with a “signal
difference” intentionally and strategically enacted to speak to social, politi-
cal, and economic issues (1988, p. 51; see also, Chapter 2). In short, bebop’s
harmonic, rhythmic, and structural complexity coupled with its blinding,
virtuosic improvised solos and distinctive grooves combine to create an
expression of black art music or strategic Afro-modern jazz, whose innova-
tions and contributions, given the racialized context in which they emerge,
carry with them multi-layered sociopolitical significations. To imagine that
African American bebop musicians were simply performing and creating
works for art’s sake in line with the Western art music tradition’s dis-
courses on artistic autonomy is to ignore the harsh, racialized reality and
lived experience of African Americans in the U.S. history and to conceive
of music as an ahistorical artifact untouched by its particular sociopolitical
and cultural contexts.
Although, as mentioned earlier, bebop artists were, on the one hand,
decidedly not creating music for mass consumption or for traditional “high
brow” audience. Moreover, like other highly skilled professionals, they
desired and rightfully expected a living wage. However, the complex of
American racism and modern capitalism created a particularly constricting
and slanted framework  a framework whose laws, discourses, and prac-
tices privileged (white) copyright owners while diminishing music-makers,
especially black improvising music-makers. Before concluding this section,
let me illustrate how bebop as an inflection of strategic Afro-modernism
worked within and against these slanted structures and discourses in order
to resist and transform the commodifying practices of capitalism  and of
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course simultaneously struggled against racist (il)logic.7 From a music-
theoretical perspective one could make a strong argument that composition
and improvisation are emphases on a single continuum and thus differences
between the two are more matters of degree; however, in the socio-
economic sphere the difference between the socially prestigious label, “com-
poser,” and the socially stereotyped label, “improviser,” is stark.8 The
traditional Western notion privileging the composer over the jazz improvi-
ser or the “mere” performer per se views the composer as the sole or
primary originator and author of the musical piece. This understanding
of what a composer is and does is intimately tied to the development of
musical notation. A musical score takes the live, dynamic performed music
and reduces it to signs on a page. From one perspective, such technologies
are completely understandable, legitimate, and even helpful to the process
of preserving and transmitting music to subsequent generations. From
another perspective, these fixed (silent) signs make it easy to ascribe
ownership and thus creative primacy and economic privileges to specific
individuals. Within the framework of modern capitalism and its drive to
commodify, ownership and copyright laws go hand in hand. Since the
improviser is viewed as a mere performer, a conduit or tool, his or her sig-
nificant contribution  or better co-creation  that transforms the silent
signs on a page into (actual) music is diminished. Moreover, this diminish-
ment is made manifest in the economic realm.9 As Scott DeVeaux observes,
even as the artistic talent of a jazz legend such as Charlie Parker is publicly
recognized by musicians, critics, and jazz fans across the ethnic spectrum,
nonetheless “in a music industry designed to funnel profits to the owners of
copyrights, improvisers have found themselves in an anomalous and
frustrating position. The history of jazz can be read, in part, as an attempt
by determined musicians to close the gap between artistic ambition and
economic reward” (DeVeaux, 1997, p. 9).
In fact, as many scholars have pointed out, the original Copyright Act
of 1909 itself presupposes that only musical expressions that correlate to a
written composition or score qualify as copyrightable material; thus the
composer, rather than the performer, is given artistic preference, which, in
a capitalistic system, translates into economic privilege. Prior to the 1970s’
amendments to copyright laws, recorded versions or improvised perfor-
mances based on but exceeding and often transforming written scores were
not granted a legal copyright-protection status.10 Consequently, songwri-
ters (composers) and publishers received the bulk of royalty payments,
whereas performers (improvisers) were typically paid a one-time fee and
their share of the royalties was significantly less (Monson, 2007, p. 336).
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Monson provides an excellent example of how such laws favored the
composer/songwriter economically and continued to reinforce the idea
that the composer/songwriter is the sole musical creator, whereas the
improviser/performer is simply a conduit giving expression to the compo-
ser’s musical intentions. Take, for instance, Miles Davis’ 1956 recording of
“My Funny Valentine” by Rogers and Hart. Here we have an improvised
performance that includes significant harmonic and rhythmic additions, as
well as masterful improvised solos creating a new form that many deem
superior to the original version. However, as Monson notes, “Davis’s
unique version of the tune was not copyrightable.” Moreover, not only did
the songwriters and publisher receive the mechanical royalties, but when
Davis’s version was heard on radio or TV, additional broadcast royalties
were earned by the songwriters and publisher and collected by the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP)
(Monson, 2007, p. 30). Such a system clearly exhibits an unfair economic
benefit for (mainly white) composers, publishers, and those controlling the
radio and television broadcasting industry.
Having discussed bebop’s hybrid character, its strategic deployments
as an expression of Afro-modernism, and the problematic aspects of the
early twentieth-century copyright laws, I turn now to a more technical dis-
cussion about discourses. Specifically, I shall bring Foucault’s analyses of
conditioning structures, discourses, and acceptability conditions into con-
versation with Monson’s work on jazz discourses and sonic signifyin(g).
Foucault on the Social Layers and Acceptability Conditions of Discourses
As Foucault has taught us, what surfaces as the prevailing discourses
of a particular period in no way exhausts the reality or complexity of
phenomena. In his work, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault con-
cerns himself not merely with traditional philosophy of language inquiries
such as what counts as a true or false statement. For Foucault, an equally
important question is: what are the conditions that make possible a state-
ment or a discourse showing up so that it actually counts at a particular
moment in history as a statement or discourse “worthy” of being judged as
true or false? In other words, Foucault’s analyses focus upon the circum-
scriptive background “space” that allows various discourses and statements
to emerge in the first place. This circumscriptive space, or to use Foucault’s
terminology, the historical a prioris of various epochs, consists of sets of
rules or standards that determine not which statements are veridical (dire
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vrai) but which statements are in the true (dans le vrai) (see also,
Thompson, 2008, esp. p. 12).
Stated from a slightly different angle, to be in the true is inextricably
linked with what Foucault calls the “acceptability” of truth and the
“acceptability of a system” such as the carceral system or the healthcare
system (see, e.g., Foucault, 2007, p. 61). Acceptability conditions speak of
the conditions that allow a statement to show up as a recognizable state-
ment while bracketing questions of the statement’s truth-value. Thus, for
Foucault, a proposition that has already been received by a particular
discipline such as music, physics, biology, and so forth is a proposition
dans le vrai; however, its status as dans le vrai does not equate with its
truth; it may in fact be received as true yet proven false at a later date.
Once we recognize Foucault’s focus on the acceptability conditions of pro-
positions and discourse  rather than on the truth-value of statements 
we can better understand his claim: “[a] discipline is not the sum total of all
the truths that may be uttered concerning something; it is not even the total
of all the truths that may be accepted, by virtue of some principle of coher-
ence and systematization” (Foucault, 1972, p. 223). Take, for example, the
former (pseudo-)scientific discourse concerning race as a bio-behavioral
essence determinative of one’s intellectual and moral value. Although such
claims were considered true in several academic and other discourses (and
thus achieved the status of dans le vrai), they were in fact false (and thus
did not have the actual status of dire vrai). As noted earlier, this past notion
of race is no longer the consensus view among social scientists, anthropolo-
gists, and scholars of race and ethnicity; yet the discourse regarding race as
essentialized and fixed in biology, even though false, had a widespread and
injurious impact upon American society. Lastly, a statement qualifying as
dire vrai, can, paradoxically, be both true (dire vrai) and not true (dans le
vrai).11 For example, the present widely accepted discourse regarding race
as a social construction  a discourse that is today accepted as dire vrai 
would not have “shown up” as a potential candidate to consider. In other
words, the acceptability conditions for such a discourse to be heard were
not present as they are in contemporary academic discourses. In short,
historically specific structuring (acceptability) conditions that function as
historical a prioris have the ability, as it were, to silence true (dire vrai)
propositions and discourses; that is, they can prevent true discourses from
appearing at all. Thus, these muted or unarticulated discourses can
and often have emerged in a subsequent historical period whose acceptabil-
ity conditions allow new discourses not only to sound but also to be
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heard  a hearing that then allows for the possibility of judging their truth
or falsity.
Monson on Racialized Jazz Discourses and Saying Something Sonically
Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of discourse as, generally speaking, lin-
guistically articulated ideas used to establish one’s argument and to justify
one’s position, and which “possess the authority and prestige to order how
we think about the world,” Monson describes the multiple musical,
cultural, and sociopolitical discourses and strategic practices operative in
the world of jazz in America in the mid-twentieth century (2007, p. 24). In
addition, Monson’s Foucauldian-influenced account helps us to understand
better why certain discourses about jazz emerged and why others did not
(and could not) until a later period.
As Monson explains, jazz discourses of the 1940s1960s had become
overly binary and highly racialized. On the one hand, we find a liberal, uni-
versalist, colorblind discourse depicting jazz as neither black nor white but
rather as “a colorblind art music open to all who master its repertory,
improvisational mode of musical creation, and demand for individuality
and originality” (Monson, 2007, p. 70). On the other hand, we find black
and white musicians, scholars, critics, and supporters who reject the color-
blind discourse and emphasize the African American origins of jazz; how-
ever, their arguments often presupposed and deployed an unhelpful,
essentialized notion of blackness to articulate the constitutive esthetic
elements of jazz. For many in the latter group, to insist on a colorblind dis-
course was just another variation on a long history of white confiscation of
(and profiting from) black cultural contributions and innovations. Given
the long history of racism, the exploitation of African American musicians,
and the continuation (although in different forms) of entrenched racialized
structures and unjust economic practices, one can understand why the
discursive framework shaping jazz discourses had become so polarized well
into the 1960s. Rather than an either/or  that is, jazz as either universal,
colorblind, and untouched by history, or as ethnically particular and
essentially black, Monson articulates a third way beyond this impasse. That
is, she highlights the porousness and hybridity of jazz esthetics and demon-
strates how the very construction of a jazz Afro-modernism not only
represents an innovative and significant artistic contribution but also says
something or signifies (in Gates’s sense) in the sociopolitical realm. This
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signification occurs not only via the discourses surrounding jazz but also in
the music itself, which communicates irony, humor, and sounds a critique
of the unjust social, political, and economic system (see also, Floyd, 1995,
Chapter 4; Monson, 1994).
For example, take John Coltrane’s transformation of the popular
Broadway tune, “My Favorite Things.” Coltrane’s “signification” upon the
tune is a multiple-layered example of structural, harmonic, melodic, and
rhythmic modifications. The modifications so alter the original tune that
jazz esthetes  both black and white  acknowledge Coltrane’s version as
superior. As Monson explains, Coltrane’s creation, “makes the interludes,
not the verse, the subject of the performance; it transforms waltz time into
a polyrhythmically textured six-feel; and it transforms a sentimental, opti-
mistic lyric into a vehicle for a more brooding improvisational exploration”
(1996, p. 116). Moreover, the Coltrane version carries within it and com-
municates (to those with ears to hear) ironic overtones. The new polyrhyth-
mic groove and the protracted improvised solos re-write the lyrical images
of “girls in white dresses,” “snowflakes on eyelashes,” and other “white
things” and communicate a weighty, contemplative, and at times menacing
feel. Given that Coltrane’s version of the tune emerged during the years of
the Civil Rights Movement, it is certainly possibile that Coltrane intended
his musical interpretation to make an ironic and socially critical statement.
Even if this was not the case, one need not limit the possible range of mean-
ings of a musical work to the intentions of the composer(s). Just as the
dynamic ontology of texts allows for multiple interpretations over time by
different interpretative communities and traditions, the same is true with
musical pieces. In addition to these examples of sonic irony, Monson high-
lights how Coltrane’s transformation of “My Favorite Things” strategically
employs European American musical standards for its own purposes. That
is, by traditional standards of Western classical music, the original tune
and arrangement would be judged as exceedingly basic and unoriginal.
However, Coltrane’s version with its sophisticated harmonic and rhythmic
textures not only surpassed the original when judged by jazz esthetical stan-
dards but also illustrated how jazz musicians can “invoke selectively some
of the hegemonic standards of Western classical music in their favor”
(Monson, 1996, p. 120). Lastly, these strategic moves occur simultaneously
with the creation of something new  an African American jazz esthetic
that becomes an evaluative standard by which non-African American
music and musicians are judged.
In order to demonstrate the hybridity of bebop, Monson highlights the
multiple esthetic streams constituting jazz. These streams include: blues,
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gospel, R&B, American popular songs (e.g., Tin Pan Alley), modern classi-
cal music, African and Afro-Cuban esthetics, and Indian, as well as other
non-Western, esthetics (Monson, 2007, p. 71). What emerges from this
creative and strategic harmonization is, as we have already noted via
Ramsey, a new Afro-modernist esthetic  a new black modernist esthetic
that was, on the one hand, “more populist than its European art music
counterpart, and on the other, committed to articulating its elite position
relative to the more commercial genres of R&B and rock and roll”
(Monson, 2007, p. 71). Thus, the creative artistry and sociopolitical astute-
ness of bebop musicians like Gillespie, Parker, and a host of others actively
defined the “aesthetic center of this canonic period in jazz,” transforming
and bringing into existence an Afro-esthetic  a “blackening of modern
aesthetics, which would ultimately serve as a standard against which any
player of jazz would be evaluated” (Monson, 2007, p. 71).
On this model, African American jazz musicians such as Gillespie,
Parker, Davis, Coltrane, and others are acknowledged as the creative inno-
vators whose standard-setting contributions and leadership made bebop
and continues to exert significant influence on contemporary jazz musi-
cians. However, this model starts with and employs a view of race and
esthetics as socially constructed rather than “natural” and fixed.12
Although structures and discourses can become entrenched and can impute
meanings to physical characteristics (in the case of “race,” phenotypic mar-
kers) and musical features (in the case of jazz, syncopated rhythms), such
meanings are open to change over time as practices “on the ground” work
to change the discourses and structures. Thus, by rejecting an essentialist-
informed and hence fixed notion of bebop’s Afro-modernist esthetic, one
can acknowledge its hybridity and avoid overly rigid and often stereotypi-
cal definitions of “authentic” black music  stereotypes that all too often
fail to acknowledge the extensive esthetic range of African American musi-
cians. Yet this model also allows one to draw attention to the differences in
lived experience between white and black jazz musicians given the institu-
tional and structurally racist system. For example, due to structural white
privilege, white jazz musicians, many of whom were talented and acknowl-
edged as so by their black counterparts, received the highest paying gigs
and widespread and sustained press coverage in jazz and other publica-
tions, and were granted disproportionate radio and television performance
opportunities in comparison to black musicians. Likewise, many black jazz
players whose talents surpassed their white counterparts were not only
denied prestigious performance opportunities but also regularly subject to
unjust, disdainful, and even violent treatment both onstage and offstage
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and especially when touring in southern states. Here Monson emphasizes
an important distinction between an “individual’s self-conscious identity
(whether ethnic or political) and that person’s treatment as a citizen within
the larger sociology of race relations in the United States” (2007, p. 73).
A white, liberal progressive may possess a heightened ethnic consciousness
and have no intentional desire to benefit from white privilege; nonetheless,
he or she does in fact benefit daily from racially skewed sociopolitical and
economic structures. Similarly, whether white or black, a musician can
choose and develop skills allowing him or her to participate in multiple
musical esthetics, styles, and traditions; however, exercising one’s “aesthetic
agency” and achieving recognizable musical skills does not by itself change
the larger sociopolitical and economic structures. Policies, legislation,
cultural, and other discourses must also change. This is not to negate an
individual’s esthetic choices; it is, however, to acknowledge the complexity
of the structural strata constituting society and the fact that structures
change at a much slower rate than practices and require transformations
from multiple spheres.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have argued that jazz esthetics and inflections of jazz such
as bebop are socially conditioned, dynamic, and hybrid in character. To
affirm the fluid and hybrid character of jazz, bebop, and Afro-modernist
esthetics neither renders impossible our ability to identify discernible
features of particular styles and esthetic traditions nor requires that we
accept a colorblind discourse about jazz. Rather, my model, following
Monson and a host of others, affirms that sociopolitical, cultural, legal,
and economic structures and practices influence and condition all types of
music-making. Bebop as an inflection of Afro-modernism is of course no
exception. In fact, I have emphasized that in order to have a historically
rich and comprehensive understanding of bebop, one must consider the
social, political, and highly racialized context in which this music (and its
discourses) emerged. To neglect the sociopolitical import of bebop is to dis-
play one’s ignorance of the African American signifyin(g) tradition.
Moreover, it is, as Lott puts it, to fail to see that the “self-conscious
advances of bebop” are part of “a moment, the early forties, in which
unpaid historical bills were falling due” (Lott, 1988, p. 587).
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NOTES
1. Admittedly, I have already set up an artificial binary with my discourse
of white and black. Other ethnicities, groups, and esthetical traditions likewise con-
tributed to the sociopolitical struggles of the period and to the ongoing creation of
various jazz styles (e.g., Afro-Cuban and West Indian influences).
2. Of course, these “discernible features” are themselves hybrid in nature having
arisen from multiple musical genealogies, practices, and appropriations.
3. Monson further explains how these binary impositions “collapsed ethnic and
cultural distinctions within populations of African descent” (e.g., Caribbean popu-
lations and Creoles populations in Louisiana) and likewise flattened and masked
the ethnic diversity among European immigrant groups (2007, p. 9).
4. One could argue that other animals such as birds also create music. To an
extent, I certainly agree. However, I would argue that the level of harmonic, melo-
dic, and rhythmic complexity, the double-voicedness, and the strategic and political
intentional purposes of both the instrumental and vocal music I examine in the
present study are distinctively human cultural products.
5. Monson provides a helpful analysis of the political context and message
of Max Roach’s work, Freedom Now Suite, and the sociopolitical ideals and
philosophies that inspired both Roach and Abby Lincoln (Monson, 2007, see esp.
pp. 171181).
6. Ramsey discusses several mid-twentieth century “processes and their contra-
dictions and paradoxes” including: mass migration, the (mis)use of black bodies, an
emerging black defiance that helped to fuel effective political strategies and collec-
tive actions, and lastly, the multiple and “conflicting discourses on art’s role in
social change” (2003, p. 98, see also, Chapter 5, “We Called Ourselves Modern,”
esp. pp. 98105).
7. For a discussion of the resistance elements of bebop within the marketplace,
see DeVeaux (1997, esp. pp. 2027).
8. For a theoretical analysis deconstructing the assumed rigid dichotomy
between composition and improvisation, see Nielsen (2009).
9. DeVeaux sums up this process nicely: “Notation imposes upon music the
idea of a permanent text to which authorship can safely be ascribed and ownership
securely established. Such fixity is a necessary precursor to commodification” (1997,
p. 10).
10. The federal copyright laws were amended in the 1970s to cover recordings.
See, Monson (2007, p. 336, no. 2). See also, DeVeaux (1997, esp. pp. 1112). As
DeVeaux explains, the growing ascendancy of recordings over sheet music did not
change the economic privileges and power structures. “[E]conomic power remained
stubbornly in the grip of music publishers, who insisted (with the help of copyright
law) that all financial benefits to creativity must flow to officially recognized
composers. Since royalties for performance per se were relatively rare (contracts
typically dictated a modest one-time fee), ‘mere’ performers saw very little of this
money, unless they somehow managed to claim the role of composer” (p. 12).
11. It is also the case that a statement can be false and yet true (dans le vrai);
such was the case with the aforementioned dominant view of race as a
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bio-behavioral racialized essence in the nineteenth century. It passed the “accept-
ability test,” yet it was clearly false.
12. Monson’s model and mine share many similarities such as our affirmation of
the hybridity and dynamism of jazz esthetics as well as its socially conditioned char-
acter. Likewise, we both emphasize the innovative and standard-setting contribu-
tions of African American musicians in creating and developing jazz and bebop in
particular.
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